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Abstract
This paper estimates the possible e¤ects of o¤shoring on Japanese employment.
Both the positive and negative e¤ects are here considered as a result of both the o¤-
shoring of production (or materials) and services. My main nding is that the net
amount of jobs lost to o¤shoring during the past two and a half decades is negli-
gible, as it was the role of o¤shoring as a source of sector-bias change in an era of
major structural changes for Japan. I argue that, as a natural result of trade and
prot-seeking, the positive and negative forces entailed in the relocation of activities
worldwide tend to compensate each other. Further, the evidence presented here hints
at the possibility of skill upgrading only as a result of services o¤shoring.
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1 Introduction
The goal of this study is to determine the e¤ects of o¤shoring, both of materials and services,
on Japanese domestic employment. Strictly speaking, relocation processes usually entail the
laying o¤ of workers domestically. But what if this "job destruction" is a mere reassignment
of tasks within or between rms, industries, or sectors of the economy? What if the nal
net e¤ect on employment is not signicant overall? And nally, can we not be led to believe
that this "job destruction" actually makes room for more productive activities (e.g. skill
upgrading)? I answer yes to all three questions.
O¤shoring in general and services o¤shoring in particular seem to be relatively new phe-
nomena. Multiple breakthroughs in the past few decades in the area of telecommunications
have opened the door to such entrepreneurial practices. Thanks to the development of the
Internet, every task that can now be put through a wire is liable to be relocated. These tech-
nological advances have motivated a new or second-generation o¤shoring basically centered
around services, which came after the rst wave of o¤shoring of production processes.1
But to what point this is really new? After all, from the era of Smith and Ricardo
entrepreneurs have unalterably kept on maximizing their prots through trade. The invisible
hand is as in force today as it ever was. Can we not think of o¤shoring as a particular form
of trade? In fact, some modern economists dene it as the ultimate manifestation of trade
(Mankiw and Swagel, 2006) from which the world as a whole cannot lose (Blinder, 2006).
We might as well be saying that, as in the basic Ricardian theory of trade, there are two sides
(the o¤shoring and hosting partners here) which can mutually benet from this particular
exchange.
Of course, adjustment costs for some workers and rms are one harsh reality. But
productivity gains and price cuts that could lead to a gradual stimulation of the domestic
demand for goods and services are also another possibility. Therefore, it might not be the
quantity of workers that should worry us much. Perhaps, it is the employment composition
across industries or sectors of the economy that we should focus on more intensively. Shifts
in this composition due to o¤shoring are commonly addressed as a form of sector bias
(Arndt, 1997, 1998, and 1999). However, another alternative is to interpret o¤shoring as
a factor-bias change within labor markets (Feenstra and Hanson, 1996, 1999). Here, high-
skilled employment results favored after o¤shoring takes place because low-skill activities
are more prone to go o¤shore due to potential labor cost gains. This might just produce an
increase in the skill-intensity of production that comes with an increase in the wage rate for
high to low-skilled labor.2
In the past few decades Japan has entered an era of structural changes. Some of them
1Here I refer to it as materials o¤shoring, for reasons that will become clear later. This has been the
usual name given in the literature.
2Krugman (2000) and Leamer (1998) elaborate models on relative factor prices adjustments as a result
of either sector or factor bias.
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were encouraged by the government (like the change in lifestyle habits), but others were the
natural result of a developed and still growing economy. Especially during the 1990s, the
manufacturing sector began to lose terrain to services as the exports-led model showed its
rst signs of exhaustion. Naturally, this deindustrialization process implied a readjustment
of factors among both these sectors that coincided with the post-bubble restructuring and
a regional crisis in 1997. Was there a role for o¤shoring during this era? Can o¤shoring
account for much of this sector bias? I argue below that the amount of workers actually
involved in this process is negligible. As for factor bias, even though it goes beyond the scope
of this paper, I present some evidence that hints at potential skill upgrading for Japanese
workers.
To carry out the empirical analysis, the Japanese Industry Productivity database (JIP)
o¤ers a vast amount of information on 108 industries covering the whole economy during
the years 1970 to 2005. The industry classication used by the JIP database does not
correspond exactly to the industry classication of other well-known databases (e.g. ISIC,
rev. 3, or the EU KLEMS project), yet stands as a close approximation.
Following Feenstra and Hanson (1996, 1999) I use these data to produce an index of
o¤shoring intensity based on the import content of intermediate trade. Afterwards, I es-
timate the direct e¤ects of o¤shoring on employment through the labor demand setting
proposed by Amiti and Wei (2005, 2006). There, o¤shoring enters the labor demand equa-
tion as an inverse proxy of foreign labor prices. The nal e¤ect of both types of o¤shoring
on employment is ambiguous, and depends on the strength of the substitution and scale
e¤ects which may vary from industry to industry. Luckily, the structure of the data allows
for an industry-by-industry approach, instead of the usual panel estimation regularly found
in this sort of studies. Once I obtain the o¤shoring elasticities for each industry, both of
materials and services, I estimate the change in employment that resulted from a change
in the o¤shoring variable. That is, the contribution of o¤shoring to the real changes in
employment.
Additionally, I perform a simple correlation analysis between the estimated elasticities
and other variables of interest. Here I try to identify a general prole of industries with
large e¤ects (positive and negative) of o¤shoring. In doing this separate analysis I take
advantage of the information on the di¤erent categories of workers, also provided by the
JIP database. This part of the paper, yet humbler in its pretensions, is more in line with
studies concerning a factor bias of o¤shoring.3 For instance, in a sample of US occupations,
Blinder (2007) nds that there is little or no correlation between the occupations level of
o¤shorabilityand the skill level of its workers.
The structure of the paper goes as follows. Section 2 explains our o¤shoring measure
3There is a heap of references on this particular subject. Among others, see Berman et al. (1994),
Canals (2006), Crinò (2007), Egger and Egger (2003, 2005), Ekholm and Hakkala (2006), Feenstra and
Hanson (1996, 1999), Geishecker and Görg (2005), Hijzen et al. (2005), and Strauss-Kahn (2004).
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and discusses its evolution for the Japanese economy in a very general way. Section 3
presents data on Japan for the period 1970-2005, highlighting the deindustrialization process
undertaken in later years and the contribution of each industry to the countrys o¤shoring
intensity. Section 4 sets up the framework on which we later take up our empirical analysis.
In section 5 we show our estimations on the o¤shoring-induced employment change, both
for our materials and services o¤shoring indices, and both as regards positive and negative
e¤ects. Section 6 goes over some nal remarks.
2 The o¤shoring index
The particular subject of o¤shoring for Japan is even less clear and documented than that of
her blazing success throughout great part of the 20th century. The truth is that few surveys
have so far gone exhaustively through the details on the real extent of this relatively new
phenomenon.
One of these surveys is Tomiura (2005), who considers data from 1998 of 118.300 rms
in the manufacturing sector. Here, nearly 98 percent of the rms did not o¤shore any of
their production overseas. The study also nds the endowment of human skills and the
experience with FDI to be highly related to these business practices. In the same line,
more productive rms and those whose products are more labor-intensive display a larger
o¤shoring intensity. Two limitations of the study, as made explicit by the author, lead us
to treat these conclusions with some care. First, o¤shoring of services is not covered, and
second, only manufacturing rms are considered.
Another survey is Ito et al. (2007). The authors here analyze data from 2006 including
more than 5.000 large-sized rms from the manufacturing sector. Their main results indicate
that o¤shoring is more present now than ve years ago, and that services o¤shoring is still
of a rather narrow scope as compared to materials. Also according to these data, o¤shoring
of Japanese rms is mainly restricted to own a¢ liates within East Asia. To the problem
of the limited size of the sample we should also add that the data refers to manufacturing
rms alone.
It is therefore of key interest to ll in the gaps left by the previous literature and thus
enrich the ongoing research. More, estimates by consulting companies (Forrester, 2004, and
McKinsey, 2003, for instance) have in general tended to magnify the real extent of o¤shoring
as well as its potential e¤ects in terms of job losses. For this reason, a more in-depth analysis
is certainly required, now introducing the services sector into the picture and implementing
a comprehensive index of both materials and services o¤shoring.
Following Feenstra and Hanson (1996, 1999) I dene the o¤shoring intensity of indus-
tries as the share of imported intermediate inputs in the total purchase of inputs. This is
indeed an indirect indicator, and the rationale for using it goes as follows. To begin with,
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o¤shoring always implies the relocation of entrepreneurial functions or activities abroad.
These foreign activities, it is to expect, will eventually feed back into domestic production
processes through the importing of inputs. We should yet note that importing trade stands
for an important amount of intra and inter rm trade nowadays, and this, it is also argued,
can have a stronger inuence on employment and wages than trade in nal goods (Feenstra
and Hanson, 2001, p.1). As a result, o¤shoring "intensity" is proxied by an index of input
trade, and this is equally useful both for its measurement and the assessment of its e¤ects
on the labor market.
As done subsequently and for the very rst time by Amiti and Wei (2005, 2006), I divide
this index in its materials and services versions. Respectively, these indices stand for the
share of imported material inputs in total material inputs (OSM) and the share of imported
service inputs in total service inputs (OSS). More formally, we have:
OSMit =
P
j

Mjt
QMt
i
jt
Djt

and OSSit =
P
k

Skt
QSt
i
kt
Dkt

(1)
whereMjt and Skt are purchases of material input j and service input k by industry i at time
t, QMt and Q
S
t are total inputs of materials and services used by i at time t, while  is total
imports of goods j or k and D their domestic demands.4 Due to data availability issues, the
rst term in both formulas generally stems from input-output tables, while the second term,
which is an economy-wide import share, is obtained from trade data. This is not our case
though, for the JIP database contains all the necessary information to calculate both indices.
However, the dark side of it is that they cannot escape the drawbacks commonly attached to
all the Feentra-Hanson-type indices. First, o¤shoring does not necessarily imply an increase
of imports, and vice versa. And second, to estimate the import content of intermediate
trade in (1), the economy-wide import share or import penetration ratio (the second term)
is taken as equal for every industry. This is due to data constraints, and supposes that all
industries import the input material j and the input service k with the same intensity.
It is also to note that our formulas above are somewhat di¤erent to those o¤ered by
Amiti and Wei (2005, 2006), and thus, not directly comparable. Relying almost exclusively
on data from the manufacturing sector, these authors split the ratio of imported inputs to
total inputs (that is, a "total o¤shoring index") in two, materials and services, so as to
share a common denominator.5 Contrariwise, the two indices presented here are not related
because the denominators are not the same. Consequently, adding up both indices is not
possible and would not, in our case, deliver a "total o¤shoring" index. The reason for doing
4Other similar indices often found in the literature are: the share of imported inputs in output (Egger
and Egger, 2003, 2005), or the vertical specialization index, which accounts for the imported input content
of exports (Campa and Goldberg, 1997, and Hummels et al., 2001).
5This translates to: OSit = OSM
0
it +OSS
0
it =
P
j

Mjt
Qt
i 
jt
Djt

+
P
j

Sjt
Qt
i 
jt
Djt

where OSit repre-
sents total o¤shoring and Qt is all nonenergy material inputs plus the following ve service inputs: commu-
nication, nancial, insurance, other business services, and computing and information.
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this is the following. Consider for a moment a hypothetical economy where only two cars are
produced: Ford and Chevy. If we were interested in knowing the overall share of defective
cars, we only have to divide the total number of defective by the total production. Yet the
story would be a slightly di¤erent one if we were to gauge the number of defective in both
brands as a share of their outputs. This is what I do here and where I depart from Amiti
and Wei. I think this observation was necessary at this point, for since I do use data for
the whole economy (unlike Amiti and Wei), our measures here should better illustrate the
phenomenon in both its versions, materials and services.
Figure 1: Materials and services o¤shoring, 1980-2005
Note: materials and services o¤shoring indices according to formula (1), weighted by industry GDP.
Source: all tables and gures calculated from JIP database (2006, 2008).
According to the formulas in (1), gure 1 reproduces both o¤shoring measures at the
country level.6 I should point that these o¤shoring indices do not account for the region of
origin of the imported intermediate inputs, since these data were unavailable. What we get
from gure 1 is that materials and services o¤shoring, proxied by the trade in intermediates,
have dissimilar patterns of growth in Japan. While the one has grown unrelentingly for much
of the period of study, the other has remained practically unchanged. A couple of facts are
worth stressing at this point.
6To calculate both indices I employ the Input-Output tables in section 1.4 of JIP and the nal demand
tables in section 1.7, both at constant prices (2000). The import gures had to be linearly interpolated;
only years 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, and 2000 were available. As a result, the analysis of the employment
e¤ects of o¤shoring starts in 1980.
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First, materials o¤shoring, proxied by its import content in the industriestotal use of
materials, is expectedly more predominant. Second, the annual rate of growth of services
o¤shoring is, on average, surprisingly smaller than that of materials in the whole sample
period (1.98% to 5.31%). Globalization and the technologies revolution would have led us
to believe the opposite. Only prior to the bubble crisis and the period known as the lost
decade (1990-2000) do we get to see similar rates of growth for both indices.
3 Japanese industries through 1970-2005
Even after the Izanagi boom (1965-1970), that period of unusual growth characterized by
real GDP growth rates above the 10%, the Japanese managed to keep a more than enviable
position in the world economy. It is a known fact that Japan has for long trod on the
shiny path of success, pretty much unaware of the many international crises that shook less
fortunate economies. However, the economy awoke to the toils of real life as soon as the
Heisei ("bubble") boom ended in 1990, and people started wondering about the countrys
uncertain fate. With a large and eager market at the doorstep and the need to gain e¢ ciency
to accommodate to the ups and downs of the slump, Japanese entrepreneurs began to put
aside their former suspicions and embark more condently on o¤shoring strategies. This
change in the business philosophy has notably materialized in higher levels of materials
o¤shoring, yet time is apparently not ripe for services (see gure 1).
In this section I intend to set out the study as to account for the main features that
characterize the di¤erent industries in our sample. Accordingly, it is rst necessary to
assess the weight of every industry in the real economy, and then proceed to check their
contributions to the aggregate index of o¤shoring. This would hopefully give an idea of the
relative importance of o¤shoring across the industries and sectors of the economy.
3.1 Towards a deindustrialization era
A rst step in understanding o¤shoring, especially for such a particular economy, is to
understand how much its industries contribute to the GDP. Is Japan really that much
di¤erent when considering the shares of her manufacturing and services sectors? A look at
gure 2 would suggest that it is. Compared to other developed countries, the increase in
the share of services that comes naturally with economic development and rising incomes
has taken longer to manifest. Indeed, it is to remark the apparent stability of the shares
throughout the sample, except for the period starting in 1990. It looks like the three-sector
hypothesis has taken a while to nally sink in.7 Foresightedly, back in the 1980s Balassa and
7The three-sector hypothesis is an economic theory which divides economies into the three main sectors
of activity: primary (extraction of raw materials), secondary (manufacturing), and tertiary (services). Ac-
cording to this theory, as development takes place, the main focus of the economy should shift gradually
7
Noland (1988) put forth an explanation on why this could be so. Seemingly, the share of
services went up in the 1990s and not before, because of the diminishing of Japans strong
reliance on exports as a source of growth. With the continued decline of exports, which
had previously contributed to a high manufacturing share, the 1990s witnessed a signicant
increase in the services share of the economy. While manufacturing moved from almost 34%
of the share in 1990 to 29% in 2000, services went up from 61% to 67%; for the latter, that
is roughly a 10% increase in a decade (JIP database).
Figure 2: Sectorsshares of GDP, 1970-2005
Note: Manufacturing includes construction and civil engineering; Other is primary sector plus energy.
Further evidence of this shift is seen in table 1. Let us rst take a look at the GDP rows.
Either in terms of the total change or the compound annual growth rate index (CAGR),8
we observe a contraction in the GDP growth of the primary (plus energy) and secondary
sectors during 1990-2005. This is not the case of services, which only experienced a less
steep growth path in the post-bubble period. As for the share gures we see the important
downsizing process undergone by both the primary and manufacturing sectors. Naturally,
the former started o¤ long ago while for manufacturing industries it seemingly became
signicant during the 1990s The last row presents a summary of the evolution for the
total economy, showing the same pattern as before: a less than modest growth from 1990
onwards.
from the primary, through the secondary, and nally to the tertiary sector.
8This can be expressed as follows: CAGR =

ending value
beginning value
( 1# of years )   1
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Table 1: GDP and GDP shares, growth by sector, 1970-2005
Total change (%) CAGR (%)
1970-2005 1970-1989 1990-2005 1970-2005 1970-1989 1990-2005
Other GDP 28,10 38,75 -10,65 0,69 1,65 -0,70
share -52,07 -36,29 -23,90 -2,02 -2,23 -1,69
Manufacturing GDP 91,20 98,48 -7,04 1,82 3,49 -0,46
share -28,45 -8,87 -20,82 -0,93 -0,46 -1,45
Services GDP 238,69 142,22 33,04 3,45 4,52 1,80
share 26,74 11,22 13,31 0,66 0,53 0,78
Total GDP 167,24 117,78 17,41 2,77 3,97 1,01
We need now to go deeper and see what particular industries make the economy tick.
Without any doubt the 1990s were a special time for Japan, a time of changes (some
would say its not over yet). The burst of the bubble on the last day of 1989, a soaring
unemployment rate, an unbridled government debt, the aging population problem, and a
severe productivity slowdown, to name just a few. And along these events there came the
take-o¤ in services. This was motivated somehow by the exhaustion of an export-led model
of growth, together with a change in the attitude of the Japanese towards a more leisure-
oriented lifestyle. The government even pushed to achieve this "lifestyle transformation", in
measures like adopting ve-day weeks, establishing new public holidays, promoting Monday
holidays and, also, promoting the shortening of the total working hours per week (see Fuess,
2006). Certainly, all these facts helped somehow in increasing the consumption of service
goods and in making 1990 a turning point year for the Japanese economy.
Table 2 o¤ers some detailed information. A generalized drop in the shares of most
manufacturing industries is perceived during the period that followed 1990. In fact, only 14
manufacturing industries out of 56 displayed a higher average contribution to the GDP for
1990-2005, compared to 1970-1989 (see the column labeled ). On the other hand, there
were 22 services industries out of 42 displaying that same pattern. In terms of growth of
these contributions (or shares) to the GDP, we have that the CAGR has been positive for
20 manufacturing and 27 services industries, for the whole sample period. Again, if we were
to divide the sample in two as before (1970-1989 and 1990-2005), then the CAGR indices
turn out higher for the latter period in 10 manufacturing and 22 services industries (see
the column labeled  p.p.). All these data point to the agglomeration of activities in the
services sector, suggesting that the 1990s implied a strong deindustrialization process for
Japan.
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Further, as a complementary note, employment data come to conrm the shift towards
services industries as the economy went through the 1990s and on into the next millennium.
A quick glance at the right-hand part of table 2 reveals how employment went down in
later years in virtually all industries within the primary and secondary sectors. Other has
been the story for the services sector, where a positive change is observed in the majority
of industries (see the last column).
According to the JIP database total employment in Japan was around 54.2 million in
1970, while gures for years 1990 and 2005 were in turn 64.2 and 63.9 million.9 This,
in concurrence with the changes in employment experienced among sectors, can only be
indicative of an important structural change taking place in the 1990s. Therefore, our data
here seems to grant credit to a three-sector hypothesis that has taken longer to materialize
in Japan, as compared to other developed countries.
Figure 3: Employment by sector (millions), 1970-2005
Note: Manufacturing includes construction and civil engineering; Other is primary sector plus energy.
To what extent this process can be blamed as taking a high toll on the economy during
the lost decadeis di¢ cult to know and escapes the limits of this work. However, it sure
has to be taken into account whenever dealing with the causes and e¤ects of a lost decade of
growth. Figure 3 and table 3 complement all previous information, highlighting the capacity
of employment absorption of the services sector during the 1990s. A cautionary remark need
9OECD data bear a high degree of similarity. Figures for those years were, according to the OECD
Economic Outlook: 50.9 million (1970), 62.5 million (1990), and 63.5 million (2005).
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here be made. Even though the employment level remained practically unchanged for the
period 1990-2005, the unemployment rate rose from 2.1% to 4.5%, reaching a maximum of
5.5% in 2002 (OECD Economic Outlook). This meant, in numbers, a change from 1.3 to
2.9 million unemployed.
In Figure 3 we see the clear diverging paths for the employment records of the three
sectors. In particular, it was from the year 1990 that manufacturing employment began
to fall. Employment gures for the year 1990 stood at 7.9, 19.5, and 36.8 million for the
three di¤erent sectors, that is: primary plus energy, manufacturing, and services. Since
total employment practically did not budge during 1990-2005, sector composition remains
of utter importance. Figures for 2005 were, respectively, 5.2, 15.0, and 43.7 million. In
rough numbers this would imply that approximately 7.2 million workers shifted either to
the services sector or the pool of unemployed in a span of 15 years. Curiously, services
employment increased in 6.9 million, but due to the lack of job mobility so typical of Japan,
one is prevented to draw the conclusion that all workers moving out of the manufacturing
sector ended up hired in the services sector. Usually, it is new entrants to the labor force
who are to be counted among those enlarging the ranks of the unemployed, but for Japan
is not yet as clear.10
Table 3: Employment growth by sector, 1970-2005
Total change (%) CAGR (%)
1970-2005 1970-1989 1990-2005 1970-2005 1970-1989 1990-2005
Other -66,76 -46,15 -36,71 -3,01 -3,05 -2,82
Manufacturing -12,15 13,00 -23,23 -0,36 0,61 -1,64
Services 80,58 48,26 18,71 1,66 1,99 1,08
Total 17,96 16,51 -0,42 0,46 0,77 -0,03
The deindustrialization process is also neatly perceived in table 3, either in changes
of sectoral employment or as seen through the compound index. As expected, the primary
sector su¤ered the major fall for the whole sample period, whereas the manufacturing sector
started to undergo its transformation in the 1990s. The negative gures in total employment,
yet of little size, can be partly understood as the outcome of the disturbing times undergone
by the economy very recently. The past slump, in coinciding with the deindustrialization
10The Japanese labor market is said to be characterized by lifetime employment, seniority wages, and rm-
based labor unions, which all add to its extreme rigidity. However, evidence on this regard has apparently
focused exclusively on male workers in large-sized companies and governmental agencies. Further research
on the subject has shown that these "three pillars" of Japanese industrial relations might not hold true
for part-time workers, short-term contract workers, and workers in small-sized rms (see Cheng, 1995, and
Cheng and Kalleberg, 1996).
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trend, must have certainly set up a network of interactions and distortions in the economy
not to be neglected. Notwithstanding its relative importance, yet due to its complex nature,
the subject is left aside for future research.
Table 4: Top and bottom industries, GDP share and employment growth
Avg. share GDP (%), 1970-2005 Avg. share GDP (%), 1990-2005 CAGR (%), 1970-2005 CAGR (%), 1990-2005
top 10
1 72 Housing 8.47 72 Housing 9.04 51 Semiconductor and circuits 14.29 51 Semiconductor and circuits 9.96
2 67 Wholesale 6.46 67 Wholesale 7.88 52 Electronic parts 9.01 52 Electronic parts 8.98
3 60 Construction 5.20 103 Public administration 5.23 86 Rental of office equipment 7.83 86 Rental of office equipment 8.36
4 68 Retail 5.02 68 Retail 4.98 49 Communication equipment 7.31 91 Information and internet ss. 7.20
5 103 Public administration 4.85 60 Construction 4.68 48 Electronics. computer eqpmnt. 5.95 78 Telegraph and telephone 5.77
6 61 Civil engineering 3.56 69 Finance 4.02 91 Information and internet ss. 5.04 83 Hygiene (private and non-profit) 5.09
7 69 Finance 3.35 88 Other services for businesses 3.48 45 Office and industry machines 4.53 99 Research (public) 4.76
8 98 Education (public) 3.25 61 Civil engineering 3.31 93 Video and sound 4.28 49 Communication equipment 4.69
9 74 Road transportation 3.02 98 Education (public) 2.93 81 Research (private) 4.01 12 Animal foods & fertilizers 3.97
10 88 Other services for businesses 2.93 74 Road transportation 2.80 78 Telegraph and telephone 3.93 105 S. insur. & s. welfare (non-profit) 2.84
bottom 10
99 34 Pottery 0.11 34 Pottery 0.09 27 Chemical fibers -4.29 24 Basic inorganic chemicals -5.71
100 101 Hygiene (public) 0.10 25 Basic organic chemicals 0.08 1 Rice, wheat production -4.36 6 Fisheries -5.79
101 21 Leather and leather products 0.10 38 Smelting non-ferrous metals 0.08 30 Petroleum products -4.45 17 Furniture and fixtures -5.95
102 4 Agricultural services 0.09 4 Agricultural services 0.08 108 Activities not classified -4.55 21 Leather and leather products -6.63
103 93 Video and sound 0.09 83 Hygiene (private and non-profit) 0.07 6 Fisheries -4.78 26 Organic chemicals -6.73
104 38 Smelting non-ferrous metals 0.09 21 Leather and leather products 0.07 7 Mining -5.64 31 Coal products -8.04
105 25 Basic organic chemicals 0.08 12 Animal foods & fertilizers 0.05 15 Textile products -5.97 15 Textile products -8.36
106 23 Chemical fertilizers 0.07 27 Chemical fibers 0.04 31 Coal products -7.15 48 Electronics. computer eqpmnt. -8.39
107 27 Chemical fibers 0.06 23 Chemical fertilizers 0.04 23 Chemical fertilizers -8.65 23 Chemical fertilizers -10.53
108 65 Water supply for industrial use 0.03 65 Water supply for industrial use 0.02 106 Research (non-profit) -17.32 106 Research (non-profit) -33.04
Employment, Δ (%). 1970-2005 Employment, Δ (%). 1990-2005 CAGR (%), 1970-2005 CAGR (%), 1990-2005
top 10
1 91 Information and internet ss. 4615.50 105 S. insur. and s. welfare (non-profit) 369.65 91 Information and internet ss. 11.30 105 S. insur. & s. welfare (non-profit) 10.15
2 105 S. insur. and s. welfare (non-profit) 1639.91 83 Hygiene (private and non-profit) 160.19 105 S. insur. & s. welfare (non-profit) 8.26 83 Hygiene (private and non-profit) 6.16
3 93 Video and sound 1305.98 93 Video and sound 160.03 93 Video and sound 7.62 93 Video and sound 6.15
4 86 Rental of office equipment & goods 682.10 91 Information and internet ss. 98.34 86 Rental of office equipment 5.88 91 Information and internet ss. 4.37
5 66 Waste disposal 577.41 82 Medical (private) 86.55 66 Waste disposal 5.46 82 Medical (private) 3.97
6 88 Other services for businesses 479.20 88 Other services for businesses 79.08 88 Other services for businesses 5.00 88 Other services for businesses 3.71
7 82 Medical (private) 355.40 66 Waste disposal 67.91 82 Medical (private) 4.30 66 Waste disposal 3.29
8 81 Research (private) 334.05 81 Research (private) 56.32 81 Research (private) 4.16 81 Research (private) 2.83
9 83 Hygiene (private and non-profit) 306.05 104 Medical (non-profit) 47.62 83 Hygiene (private and non-profit) 3.97 104 Medical (non-profit) 2.46
10 51 Semiconductor and circuits 273.84 79 Mail 33.42 51 Semiconductor and circuits 3.73 79 Mail 1.82
bottom 10
98 10 Flour and grain mill products -69.57 14 Tobacco -50.02 10 Flour and grain mill products -3.25 14 Tobacco -4.24
99 16 Lumber and wood products -71.29 6 Fisheries -50.83 16 Lumber and wood products -3.41 6 Fisheries -4.34
100 15 Textile products -71.30 1 Rice, wheat production -55.06 15 Textile products -3.41 1 Rice, wheat production -4.88
101 3 Livestock and sericulture farming -77.94 27 Chemical fibers -55.50 3 Livestock & sericulture farming -4.11 27 Chemical fibers -4.93
102 14 Tobacco -79.31 21 Leather and leather products -55.55 14 Tobacco -4.28 21 Leather and leather products -4.94
103 7 Mining -79.74 3 Livestock and sericulture farming -55.77 7 Mining -4.34 3 Livestock & sericulture farming -4.97
104 23 Chemical fertilizers -82.39 47 Household electric appliances -56.40 23 Chemical fertilizers -4.71 47 Household electric appliances -5.06
105 5 Forestry -84.44 15 Textile products -63.64 5 Forestry -5.04 15 Textile products -6.13
106 27 Chemical fibers -85.10 5 Forestry -69.16 27 Chemical fibers -5.15 5 Forestry -7.09
107 1 Rice, wheat production -85.25 10 Flour and grain mill products -72.24 1 Rice, wheat production -5.18 10 Flour and grain mill products -7.70
Note: codes by sector are 1 to 7 and 62 to 66 (other), 8 to 61 (manufacturing), and 67 to 108 (services).
To wrap up this section I rearrange table 2 as to have the data, both on GDP and
employment, laid out in rankings. Hence, the upper-left part of table 4 shows the prepon-
derance of services industries over the whole period and for the sub-period of 1990-2005,
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as regards GDP shares. Also, with a very few exceptions, manufacturing industries cover
most of the industries placing at the bottom. On the upper-right side of the table we have
the industries sorted out by their (annual) GDP growth rates. Surprisingly, we distinguish
some manufacturing industries among the top ones. One possible reason is that these in-
dustries have traditionally had a key role within the economy, hardly to be a¤ected by the
deindustrialization process on which Japan has recently embarked herself. Worse perform-
ing industries are again to be found among those belonging to the primary and secondary
sectors.
As for employment the story is straightforward. As mentioned before, the services sector
shows itself as the great benefactor for both the entire sample and the sub-sample. This is
the result of a late deindustrialization process that, coincidentally, took place in an era of
turmoil. The structural change along with the uneasy situation experienced back in those
years come to explain why total employment has remained stationary. Again, unlucky
industries turn out to be the less dynamic ones from the primary and secondary sectors.
3.2 O¤shoring by industry
Having rst dened o¤shoring in that particular way, I now focus on some possible cases of
interest. First, we can consider those industries which are o¤shoring-intensive and display
high rates of growth. Second, an industry can be o¤shoring-intensive but, at the same time,
either exhibit a large or a small GDP share. Finally, an industry can be said to meet all
these characteristics, high o¤shoring intensity, high growth rates, and a large share of the
economy. Table 5 compiles all this information. The rst two broad columns comprise all
data concerning the o¤shoring index by industry, both of materials (OSM) and services
(OSS). The right-hand side of the table provides some information about the industries
GDPs (growth and share). The idea is not to establish a causal relationship, but rather, to
come up with an overview of all major o¤shorers and the potential impact for the economy.
Let us analyze this table, step by step. The rst column under OSM is the industries
o¤shoring index of materials as calculated by (1), and averaged through 1980-2005. The
total average across industries (taking out outliers) is 6.40%, less than that of manufacturing
industries (7.07%) and more than the other two sectors, primary plus energy (6.22%) and
services (5.62%). The same can be said for the period 1990-2005 (the second column),
although the gures are now larger.11 Reasonably enough, materials o¤shoring is relatively
more present in the manufacturing sector than in the other two. The third and fourth
columns focus on the growth of this index. If we again take averages across all industries,
this would tell an unanticipated story. The averaged CAGR is 4.90%, indicating that the
services sector has an above than average growth (5.17%), while the primary plus energy
11The sheer growth in materials o¤shoring is more graphically seen in gure 1, where the index is aggre-
gated to the country level weighting by industry GDP.
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(4.77%) and manufacturing (4.72%) sectors stay below this average. This is also perceived
for the subperiod of 1990-2005.
The data in the next four columns repeats all previous information but this time on the
OSS index. Its average across all industries stands at 2.05% (no outliers), and now there
is no signicant di¤erence among services (2.05%), manufacturing (2.06%), and primary
plus energy (1.96%). For 1990-2005 the average of services is higher than the total average,
whereas for the other two is lower. As for the growth rates, the total average is 1.72%
during 1980-2005, and the services sector (2.04%) naturally gets ahead of the manufacturing
(1.63%) and primary (0.99%) sectors. In the period 1990-2005 all averages on the CAGRs
(total, services, manufacturing, and other) turn out negatively signed, and that associated
to services the less a¤ected.
The right-hand side of table 5 reports GDP data as before, but this time on the period
we have data on o¤shoring, 1980-2005. The averaged CAGR for the total economy is here
negative (-0.24%), as it is for the manufacturing (-0.43%) and primary (-2.29%) sectors but
not for services (0.63%). Data on 1990-2005 are similar, yet as speculated before and due to
this transition towards a more services-oriented economy, the di¤erence is somewhat higher.
The last two columns corroborate this, further arguing in favor of a structural change taking
place during the 1990s, specially between the manufacturing and services sectors.
According to the variable, let us now dene those industries above the average plus half
a standard deviation as big o¤shorers (o¤shoring index), highly-growing industries (GDP
CAGR), and large industries (GDP share). Therefore, for both the OSM and OSS indices
we can track down the possible cases set out in the rst paragraph of this section: high
o¤shoring intensity and high GDP growth, high o¤shoring intensity and a large GDP share,
and all three. Let us rst take a look at the OSM index.
Following these simple criteria for the whole period of analysis I recognize twenty big
o¤shorers, of which two deal with services, two belong to the primary plus energy sector,
and the rest are naturally from manufacturing. From these twenty industries I further
lter the data to obtain four big o¤shorers which, at the same time, are highly-growing
industries, namely: electronic, computer machines, and accessories; electronic equipment
and measuring instruments; electrical machinery equipment; and rental of o¢ ce equipment.
The former three are manufacturing industries and the last one is a services industry. Now,
if we lter the data as to try to get big o¤shorers which are also large industries, we cannot
produce any. In fact, none of these four industries are even above the mean in terms of GDP
share. The evidence then seems to point out that, even if materials o¤shoring is relatively
more important than services o¤shoring, it can only have a small e¤ect on the economy
after all.
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Table 6: Industriescontributions to indices, 1980-2005
JIP OSM share (p.p.) JIP OSS share (p.p.)
Rnk. code Industry 1980-2005 Rnk. code Industry 1980-2005
1 67 Wholesale 0.8171 1 103 Public administration 0.1004
2 72 Housing 0.7685 2 88 Other services for businesses 0.0872
3 103 Public administration 0.4816 3 67 Wholesale 0.0761
4 60 Construction 0.4654 4 98 Education (public) 0.0638
5 88 Other services for businesses 0.4409 5 69 Finance 0.0599
6 69 Finance 0.3208 6 91 Information and Internet ss. 0.0506
7 86 Rental of office equipment 0.2798 7 70 Insurance 0.0431
8 78 Telegraph and telephone 0.2777 8 52 Electronic parts 0.0412
9 68 Retail 0.2577 9 78 Telegraph and telephone 0.0410
10 62 Electricity 0.2005 10 60 Construction 0.0369
11 94 Eating and drinking places 0.1971 11 68 Retail 0.0287
12 91 Information and Internet ss. 0.1865 12 76 Air transportation 0.0256
13 82 Medical (private) 0.1662 13 82 Medical (private) 0.0247
14 98 Education (public) 0.1383 14 29 Pharmaceutical products 0.0220
15 89 Entertainment 0.1317 15 80 Education (private and non-p) 0.0211
16 97 Other services for individuals 0.1240 16 55 Motor vehicle parts 0.0176
17 95 Accommodation 0.1159 17 79 Mail 0.0169
18 53 Miscellaneous machinery 0.1138 18 74 Road transportation 0.0151
19 74 Road transportation 0.1117 19 51 Semiconductor and circuits 0.0150
20 52 Electronic parts 0.1025 20 89 Entertainment 0.0139
21 61 Civil engineering 0.0942 21 94 Eating and drinking places 0.0127
22 80 Education (private and non-p) 0.0891 22 62 Electricity 0.0125
23 39 Non-ferrous metal products 0.0761 23 86 Rental of office equipment 0.0124
24 71 Real estate 0.0741 24 92 Publishing 0.0115
25 70 Insurance 0.0703 25 47 Household electric appliances 0.0110
26 38 Smelting non-ferrous metals 0.0608 26 97 Other services for individuals 0.0107
27 104 Medical (non-profit) 0.0576 27 20 Printing, and plate making 0.0096
28 47 Household electric appliances 0.0570 28 53 Miscellaneous machinery 0.0094
29 51 Semiconductor and circuits 0.0568 29 58 Plastic products 0.0088
30 105 Ss. Ins. & ss. welfare (non-p) 0.0564 30 99 Research (public) 0.0086
31 29 Pharmaceutical products 0.0562 31 43 Special industry machinery 0.0085
32 43 Special industry machinery 0.0558 32 93 Video and sound 0.0084
33 102 Ss. ins. & ss. welfare (public) 0.0532 33 54 Motor vehicles 0.0083
34 96 Laundry, beauty services 0.0523 34 49 Communication equipment 0.0081
35 55 Motor vehicle parts 0.0511 35 90 Broadcasting 0.0081
36 58 Plastic products 0.0382 36 64 Waterworks 0.0079
37 16 Lumber and wood products 0.0378 37 104 Medical (non-profit) 0.0076
38 100 Medical (public) 0.0360 38 107 Other (non-profit) 0.0075
39 57 Precision machinery eqpmnt. 0.0357 39 85 Advertising 0.0072
40 28 Miscellaneous chemical pdts. 0.0345 40 28 Miscellaneous chemical pdts. 0.0067
41 13 Beverages 0.0325 41 44 Miscellaneous machinery 0.0050
42 73 Railway 0.0322 42 105 Ss. Ins. & ss. welfare (non-p) 0.0050
43 11 Miscellaneous foods 0.0317 43 100 Medical (public) 0.0046
44 77 Other transportation 0.0302 44 102 Ss. ins. & ss. welfare (public) 0.0042
45 49 Communication equipment 0.0293 45 63 Gas, heat supply 0.0041
46 2 Miscellaneous crop farming 0.0290 46 50 Measuring instruments 0.0041
47 41 Miscellaneous metal products 0.0290 47 42 General industry machinery 0.0038
48 87 Automobile maintenance 0.0288 48 13 Beverages 0.0035
49 15 Textile products 0.0280 49 45 Office and industry machines 0.0035
50 75 Water transportation 0.0273 50 96 Laundry, beauty services 0.0034
51 59 Miscellaneous industries 0.0273 51 41 Miscellaneous metal products 0.0032
52 30 Petroleum products 0.0271 52 77 Other transportation 0.0032
53 18 Pulp, paper, and other paper 0.0269 53 30 Petroleum products 0.0031
54 107 Other (non-profit) 0.0260 54 87 Automobile maintenance 0.0030
55 20 Printing, and plate making 0.0235 55 11 Miscellaneous foods 0.0023
56 46 Electrical and ind. apparatus 0.0205 56 32 Glass and its products 0.0023
57 42 General industry machinery 0.0194 57 81 Research (private) 0.0020
58 93 Video and sound 0.0192 58 66 Waste disposal 0.0020
59 45 Office and industry machines 0.0191 59 25 Basic organic chemicals 0.0017
60 79 Mail 0.0189 60 19 Paper products 0.0015
61 99 Research (public) 0.0185 61 12 Animal foods & fertilizers 0.0014
62 32 Glass and its products 0.0183 62 48 Electronics, computer eqpmnt. 0.0013
63 66 Waste disposal 0.0171 63 101 Hygiene (public) 0.0012
64 50 Measuring instruments 0.0165 64 46 Electrical and ind. apparatus 0.0011
65 19 Paper products 0.0157 65 4 Agricultural services 0.0011
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(continued)
66 108 Activities not classified 0.0156 66 9 Seafood products 0.0011
67 17 Furniture and fixtures 0.0155 67 39 Non-ferrous metal products 0.0008
68 64 Waterworks 0.0154 68 59 Miscellaneous industries 0.0006
69 35 Miscellaneous ceramic 0.0150 69 34 Pottery 0.0003
70 22 Rubber products 0.0148 70 83 Hygiene (private and non-p) 0.0001
71 1 Rice, wheat production 0.0147 71 26 Organic chemicals 0.0000
72 44 Miscellaneous machinery 0.0140 72 38 Smelting non-ferrous metals 0.0000
73 90 Broadcasting 0.0136 73 65 Water supply for industrial use 0.0000
74 14 Tobacco 0.0134 74 40 Metal products -0.0001
75 56 Other transportation eqpmnt. 0.0133 75 95 Accommodation -0.0001
76 37 Miscellaneous iron and steel 0.0120 76 18 Pulp, paper, and other paper -0.0004
77 101 Hygiene (public) 0.0118 77 27 Chemical fibers -0.0005
78 9 Seafood products 0.0105 78 57 Precision machinery eqpmnt. -0.0005
79 85 Advertising 0.0105 79 22 Rubber products -0.0006
80 40 Metal products 0.0101 80 8 Livestock products -0.0008
81 54 Motor vehicles 0.0097 81 23 Chemical fertilizers -0.0010
82 21 Leather and leather products 0.0093 82 10 Flour and grain mill products -0.0010
83 76 Air transportation 0.0088 83 21 Leather and leather products -0.0012
84 84 Other public services 0.0083 84 24 Basic inorganic chemicals -0.0013
85 34 Pottery 0.0082 85 35 Miscellaneous ceramic -0.0013
86 63 Gas, heat supply 0.0075 86 61 Civil engineering -0.0016
87 48 Electronics, computer eqpmnt. 0.0068 87 37 Miscellaneous iron and steel -0.0019
88 5 Forestry 0.0060 88 84 Other public services -0.0020
89 81 Research (private) 0.0059 89 71 Real estate -0.0022
90 8 Livestock products 0.0059 90 56 Other transportation eqpmnt. -0.0025
91 25 Basic organic chemicals 0.0057 91 31 Coal products -0.0026
92 36 Pig iron and crude steel 0.0051 92 33 Cement and its products -0.0027
93 12 Animal foods & fertilizers 0.0051 93 5 Forestry -0.0028
94 83 Hygiene (private and non-p) 0.0050 94 7 Mining -0.0035
95 10 Flour and grain mill products 0.0050 95 17 Furniture and fixtures -0.0037
96 92 Publishing 0.0047 96 108 Activities not classified -0.0038
97 3 Livestock and sericulture farming 0.0046 97 16 Lumber and wood products -0.0041
98 33 Cement and its products 0.0044 98 3 Livestock and sericulture farming -0.0041
99 4 Agricultural services 0.0040 99 75 Water transportation -0.0046
100 26 Organic chemicals 0.0039 100 1 Rice, wheat production -0.0057
101 31 Coal products 0.0013 101 36 Pig iron and crude steel -0.0062
102 65 Water supply for industrial use 0.0008 102 14 Tobacco -0.0073
103 27 Chemical fibers -0.0006 103 6 Fisheries -0.0085
104 24 Basic inorganic chemicals -0.0008 104 73 Railway -0.0105
105 23 Chemical fertilizers -0.0012 105 2 Miscellaneous crop farming -0.0114
106 7 Mining -0.0044 106 15 Textile products -0.0136
107 6 Fisheries -0.0060 107 106 Research (non-profit) -0.0255
108 106 Research (non-profit) -0.0385 108 72 Housing -0.1079
total growth in index (p.p.): 7.7279 0.8139
Note: codes by sector are 1 to 7 and 62 to 66 (other), 8 to 61 (manufacturing), and 67 to 108 (services).
For the OSS index I identify nineteen big o¤shorers, ten services, seven manufacturing,
and two primary industries. Our second-stage lter for GDP growth delivers ve industries:
pharmaceutical products; electronic, computer machines, and accessories (as with OSM);
electronic parts; video picture, sound information, character information production and
distribution; and research (public). That is, respectively, three manufacturing and two
services industries. Focusing now in o¤shoring and economic weight I can only make out
one industry, education (public), with a share of 3.18% in the total economy. Again, it is not
possible to distinguish any single industry that takes all three characteristics. Hence, services
o¤shoring does not seem more predominant in the services than in the manufacturing sector.
Further, with the exception of public education, it is to argue that the nal e¤ect (e.g.
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employment destruction) on the total economy should not be so di¤erent from that of
materials o¤shoring.
Our simple exercise here might yet be hiding some information on the nal contribution
of each industry on the growth of both indices for 1980-2005. For this reason, table 6 ranks
the contributions of each individual industry to the change in both indices from 1980 to
2005. To do that I simply multiply the industriesindices by their GDP weights. This is
how I construct the aggregate versions of the indices in gure 1.12
The column labeled "OSM share" reects the contributions to the growth in the OSM
index during our period of analysis. The last row indicates that materials o¤shoring grew
approximately 7.73 percentage points. Noticeably, much of this growth was due to activities
undertaken within the services sector. With the exception of the construction industry, the
rest of industries ranking at the top ten are from the services sector. At the other end of the
ranking and with the sole exception of research (non-prot) services, we only nd industries
from the manufacturing and primary (plus energy) sectors.
On the other hand, under "OSS share" we nd the contribution by industry to the OSS
index, which grew only 0.81 percentage points. Again, most of the growth took place within
the services sector. Construction and the electronic parts industries are the only two man-
ufacturing industries to be found among the top ten. At the bottom we now nd industries
from all three sectors in a similar proportion. Remarkably, several industries appear at
the top in both rankings, among which we can count: wholesale, public administration,
construction, other services for business, nance, rental of o¢ ce equipment, telegraph and
telephone, retail, information and internet services, medical (private), education (public),
and electronic parts. Aside from the construction and electronic parts industries, all other
industries are from the services sector.
In conclusion for this section, there are several points worth stressing. First, only nearly
a fth of all industries can be justly categorized as big o¤shorers in both cases of materials
and services inputs. On the materials side we have that only four industries are, at the same
time, highly growing industries and yet none of them bears a great weight on the economy.
On services we have only ve highly growing big o¤shorers industries and one industry which
corresponds to both the big o¤shorer and large industry classication. Second, no industry,
out of the total of 108, enjoys all three features together as put forth at the beginning of this
section: high o¤shoring intensity, high GDP growth, and a large share. Third, I nd that
with a few exceptions, services industries became the engine of o¤shoring (both of materials
and services) throughout the period of 1980-2005.
12It should remain clear that our study is already carried out at the aggregate level of the industry.
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4 The industrys demand for labor
Hamermesh (1993) goes about the various ways that could be employed to estimate the
factor substitution elasticities in a labor demand setting. He discusses three methods: (a)
direct estimation of a cost or production function; (b) labor-demand conditions; and (c)
system estimation (which is an approximation to a generalized cost or production function).
Following Amiti and Wei (2005, 2006) and Cadarso et al. (2008), I address the estimation
of the o¤shoring elasticities through method (b). If all data on inputs prices were available,
labor-demand conditions for every input should be derived. This is not the case though.
Supposing that all industries behave as single prot-maximizing rms, and further sup-
posing Cobb-Douglas technologies,13 we have:
Y = A(OSM;OSS)F (K;L) = AKL (2)
where industries use capital K and labor L to produce output Y and  and  are the factor
shares. Moreover, A is the Hicks-neutral technology parameter further dependent on the
o¤shoring indices. From the information embedded in the production function in (2), we
can specify a general cost function like (3):
C(w; r; Z) = rwZ (3)
where  is a constant and Z a vector of other exogenous variables. Cost minimization then
entails the optimal demand for inputs. In this way, minimizing total costs in (3) subject to
(2) and using Shephards lemma (Shephard, 1953), yields the factor demand functions for
K and L. Therefore, our labor demand functions can be simply stated as:
L =  (w;Z) (4)
and are dependent on the real average wages w and a vector of variables Z, among which we
can nd other factor prices, the real stock of capital, or the productivity of labor.14 Among
these prices we can identify the price of foreign labor services, which are a substitute for
domestic labor. Equation (4) becomes:
L =  (w; p; Z 0) (5)
and p is the prices on foreign labor services. Since data on p are di¢ cult to get, Amiti and
Wei suggest to use the o¤shoring intensity indices instead. Both OSM and OSS perform
13A Cobb-Douglas technology is implicitly assumed in both works mentioned in the previous paragraph.
14The great burden of work done so far also considers an output variable in the labor demand equation
(either in its value or volume measure). Webster (2003) asserts that the interpretation of the coe¢ cient on
real wages remains ambiguous, since this is to be thought as a partial and not total elasticity. For an earlier
reference see Nadiri (1968).
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as inverse proxies of the prices on foreign labor services used in the production of materials
and services respectively.
L =  (w;OSM;OSS; Z 0) j A(OSM;OSS) (6)
Here Amiti and Wei (2005, 2006) identify three channels through which o¤shoring might
a¤ect the labor demand. First, a possible substitution e¤ect between labor and prices of
imported inputs (services or materials); a drop in the latter or, equivalently, an increase in
the o¤shoring indices, would lead to a fall in the demand for labor. Second, a possible short
run productivity e¤ect of o¤shoring to impact negatively on employment. And third, the
scale e¤ect (or long run productivity e¤ect) which might a¤ect labor positively, provided
rms are more e¢ cient and competitive in the longer run due to previous productivity gains.
The dynamic representation of the estimating equation can be expressed as:
lnL = o + 1 lnL 1 + 2OSM + 3OSS + 4 lnw + 5 lnZ
0 (7)
On the expected signs of the coe¢ cients we have clearly that 4 < 0, while 2 and 3
are inconclusive, since it is not clear whether the scale e¤ects are large enough to outweigh
the substitution and productivity e¤ects. As stated before, the output may be increased in
response to o¤shoring-related productivity gains. Proof of that for Japan can be found in
the short report by Ando and Kimura (2007). Their study on Japanese data puts the stress
on the complementarity between rm level trade and FDI, suggesting that rms establishing
a¢ liates abroad do not necessarily shrink their domestic activities. Rather, it is quite the
contrary, and domestic employment can be expanded since these operations are usually
"complementary to the rest of the value added chain".
Underlying the estimation of an equation like (7) there is the potential endogeneity
problem of the o¤shoring variables. Even though instrumental variable techniques should
be recommended at this point, I refrain from doing so because of the quality of the available
instruments.
5 Employment e¤ects of o¤shoring, 1980-2005
To study the employment e¤ects of o¤shoring I rely on the estimation of every industrys
demand for labor in equation (7). I then calculate the long run elasticities15 of the o¤shoring
coe¢ cients so as to sort out the industries in the database, and see the potential e¤ect (both
positive and negative) in terms of employment. Next point is to check on several correlations
and examine if some pattern does emerge. Particularly, I am interested in the correlations
15These are simply: "LRosm;oss =
^
2;3
1 
^
1
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between the estimated elasticities of OSM and OSS and other indicators (GDP growth,
GDP weight, share of technical workers, etc.).
Before embarking in the estimation of a great number of regressions I should check the
trustworthiness of the data. Considering the structure of our database, one reasonable way
to go about it is by computing the labor share of industries and see if this furnishes a sensible
result (e.g. the labor share is less than 1).16 Out of a total of 108 industries in the original
database, I am nally left with 83 where the data behave correctly. Therefore, I estimate
83 dynamic labor demand functions separately, which entertain the o¤shoring indices as
explanatory variables. The method used is ordinary least squares.17
Thus, for 14 industries in our nal sample I nd that the long run elasticity of OSM
turns out positively signed, on 37 is zero, and on 32 is negative. On the other hand, for
the coe¢ cient on OSS I observe that long run elasticities are positive on 29 industries, zero
on 41, and negative on 13. In sum, positive e¤ects of both types of o¤shoring are found
in 43 industries and negative e¤ects in 51.18 Moreover, at rst sight services o¤shoring
appears as much friendlier than materials o¤shoring with regards to employment creation.
However, we should come to terms with the previous statement looking at how employment
changed during 1980-2005, and how much of this change could be attributed to o¤shoring.
Now I turn to the study of these numbers more in detail. This is done in two parts,
rst considering the positive e¤ects and then the negative e¤ects on employment. Later,
and using this information, I try to disentangle the correlation between those elasticities
and other selected key variables. The idea is to nd out, if possible, what features lead
industries to have large e¤ects (elasticities) on employment. Is it those which grew the
most? Or perhaps those which bear a large weight of the economy. Are capital-intensive
industries di¤erent in this regard? Here again I split the analysis into the positive and
negative e¤ects.
5.1 Long run elasticities
5.1.1 Positive e¤ects
Out of those 14 industries where OSM turns out positive, I identify 10 services and 4
manufacturing industries. Among those which have grown the most we should note the
16See Appendix A for the calculation of the labor share and further comments on its evolution through
time. Several up-to-date references on this particular subject can be found, for instance, in Wakita (2006),
and the reports by Iiduka (2006) and Takeuchi (2005).
17I am well aware of the potential endogeneity problem entailed by o¤shoring variables entering a labor
demand specication, as pointed earlier by Amiti and Wei (2005, 2006). However, due to the lack of adequate
instruments I nally decided to carry out all estimations via OLS. Di¤erent control variables like the real
capital stock or a measure of (labor) productivity were also tried with success in most of the industries.
Additionally, all estimated equations display several lags of the dependent variable, as well as the expected
negative sign associated to the real wages.
18I only pay attention to those equations which deliver a non-zero elasticity of either OSM or OSM .
That is, in total, 43 industries for the positive e¤ects, and 51 for the negative.
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rental of o¢ ce (9.69% CAGR, ranks 3rd) and information and internet services (4.39%;
ranks 6th) industries. Among the most representative we notice the business services19
industry (3.10% share of the GDP, which makes it the 5th larger industry) followed by
private medical services (2.20% share and 8th place). All four industries are from the
services sector.
Among those 29 industries with a positive e¤ect of OSS I distinguish 6 industries from
the services sector, 3 from the primary sector plus energy, and 20 from the manufacturing
sector. For those which have grown the most we have the following industries: semicon-
ductor devices (11.94% CAGR; 1st), rental of o¢ ce equipment (9.69%; 3rd), telegraph and
telephone (4.39%; 5th), information and internet services (4.39%; 6th), and electrical ma-
chinery equipment (3.34%; 9th). This is two manufacturing and three services industries.
As noted before, both the rental of o¢ ce and internet services industries also display positive
e¤ects of OSM . For those industries which account for relatively large shares of the GDP
we should highlight the retail and nance industries (5.03% and 3.64%, ranking them 2nd
and 4th), both from the services sector.
Tables 7 and 8 rank all industries by their long run (positive) o¤shoring elasticities. Pre-
cisely, the rst two columns display the short and long run elasticities of o¤shoring.20 Other
indicators of relevance are also shown in tables 7 to 10 (GDP CAGR, GDP weight, both
averaged through 1980-2005).21 Now I concentrate on the estimated impact on employment,
relying on the estimated coe¢ cients of OSM (table 7) and OSS (table 8).
Combining the information on the long run elasticities with the change in the o¤shoring
index (percentage points) and the change in the employment variable (workers) delivers the
output in the last two columns. These represent an estimation of the o¤shoring-induced
employment growth from 1980 to 2005. In other words, both columns show the growth
in employment due to o¤shoring practices (e.g. intermediate trade), the rst in absolute
values and the second as a share of the change in employment. The last row in the last four
columns exhibits the values for the whole period.
For those industries enjoying positive e¤ects of materials o¤shoring (table 7) we see
that the employment growth is rather substantial (more than 7 million). However, the
creation of job as a direct result of o¤shoring is not very signicant (23,997, only 0.32%).
For industries sporting a positive e¤ect of services o¤shoring (table 8) we see now that the
growth in employment is not as large (nearly 1 million). The estimated amount of jobs
that originate as a consequence of o¤shoring is signicantly higher nonetheless, both in
absolute and relative terms (34,637 workers, 3.66%). More in detail, the industries which
have contributed more to the previous numbers are medical (private) and other services for
19This is actually labeled as "Other services for businesses", which includes all miscellaneous services
industries not listed explicitly in the JIP database.
20Remember that the estimated coe¢ cients associated to our o¤shoring variables are actually semi-
elasticities.
21These shall be used in determining the patterns in the next section.
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businesses, for materials o¤shoring (both with approximately 6,000 workers), and the retail
industry for services o¤shoring (21,365 workers in total).
5.1.2 Negative e¤ects
In the 32 industries where negative e¤ects of OSM are found, the distribution of industries
shows a clear leaning towards the manufacturing sector. Industries are: 21 manufacturing,
7 services, and 4 primary plus energy. The industries which stand out at growing through
1980-2005 are telegraph and telephone (4.39%; 5th place) and miscellaneous machinery
(3.36%; 9th place). Those industries that represent an important share of the economy
are retail (5.03%; 2nd), nance (3.64%; 4th), and real estate (2.03%; 9th). Except for
machinery, the rest belong to the services sector.
As for the 13 industries displaying negative e¤ects of OSS I nd 6 manufacturing and 7
services. The basic organic chemicals industries appears as the most rapidly growing (3.54%,
7th) whereas private medicine and real estate are among the most representative (2.20%
and 2.03% shares; standing at the 8th and 9th places, respectively). The former industry
belongs to the manufacturing sector and the other two to the services sector.
Following up with the information comprised in tables 7 and 8, tables 9 and 10 now
sort out the (negative) long run elasticities obtained from the labor demand equations. As
before, I want to estimate the employment e¤ects of OSM (table 9) and OSS (table 10).
Again, using the long run elasticities with the change in the o¤shoring index (percentage
points) and the change in the employment variable (workers), I am able to compute the
data in the last two columns.
The last row in the last four columns summarizes the results. For the large number of
industries showing a negative e¤ect of materials o¤shoring (table 9) I observe a relatively
mild reduction in employment (almost 400,000 jobs), yet the contribution of o¤shoring to
that amount turns out meaningful (19.20%). Contrarily, industries with a negative e¤ect of
services o¤shoring (table 10) experience an increase of the employment level (one and a half
million), yet the e¤ect of o¤shoring is fairly unimportant.22 Looking upon the industries
which stand out, I can identify the one labeled as miscellaneous (around 20,500 workers) and
the retail industry (almost 10,000) for materials o¤shoring, and the real estate and medical
(private) industries for services o¤shoring (both with small numbers in comparison).
22One caveat is in order here. I am trying to estimate the contribution of o¤shoring to the change in the
employment variable. Since employment has grown, and we are now dealing with the negative e¤ects of
o¤shoring, this can be interpreted as the jobs that failed to open. In the same line, all negative percentages
in the last column should be read that way. Notice that I am supposing a positive change of the o¤shoring
index, and this, also, might not have been the case for a few of the industries.
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5.2 Correlation analysis
5.2.1 Positive e¤ects
The rst two charts in gure B1 in the appendix present the correlation between the long
run elasticities of materials ("LRosm) and services o¤shoring ("
LR
oss) and GDP growth. As shown
there, there is no apparent reason to believe that those industries faring better under this
category ought to display larger e¤ects of o¤shoring. In fact, data seem rather dispersed
and the correlations are almost null. The same logic applies to the correlation between these
elasticities and the industriesGDP shares.
The labor share measures the allocation of national income to workers, as opposed to the
owners of capital. Lower labor share ratios imply that industries are more capital intensive.
In the next two charts I wonder about this and the extent of the employment e¤ects of
o¤shoring. Both regression lines go in the same direction and even though the adjustments
are slightly better, we are far from saying that capital intensive industries are prone to larger
elasticities.
The last four charts are related. First I plot the correlation between the estimated
elasticities and the most technical group of workers as dened by the JIP database.23 Then
I add up all those groups above the production workers category and label this new group as
nonproduction workers. In both cases, yet much more signicantly in the second, a positive
relation is perceived between larger e¤ects of services o¤shoring and a higher complexity
of the tasks performed by workers. Arguably, productivity gains could be made when
redundant services are taken out and make room for new workers on new and more dynamic
activities. In other words, skill upgrading is expected in so far as the o¤shored services
correspond to lower-end categories. On the other side, the strength of the e¤ect for materials
o¤shoring shows no seeming correlation with the skill of workers.
5.2.2 Negative e¤ects
Now I repeat the analysis for the negative elasticities. The rst two charts in gure B2
plot the correlation with the GDP growth. At least for materials o¤shoring, the evidence
suggests that those industries which grew the most are less a¤ected by the negative impact of
o¤shoring. Further, industries with a high GDP weight are more inuenced by the negative
e¤ects, but this time the signicance is stronger for services o¤shoring.
As for the correlations with the labor share, the t of both regression lines is still small
but higher then before. This would point to the direction stated previously, that more capital
intensive industries show larger elasticities, both of materials and services o¤shoring.
23The JIP database includes information on the shares for di¤erent categories of workers. There are six
in total which, ordered by their skill level, can be roughly identied as: 1) professional and technical, 2)
managers and o¢ cials, 3) clerical and related workers, 4) sales, 5) service, and 6) Production process workers
and laborers.
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For the rest of the charts we now have a clearer and more signicant correlation when we
consider the most highly skilled group alone. When introducing all the other categories as to
form the nonproduction group, the relation is not that clear-cut. Larger e¤ects of o¤shoring,
both of materials and services, are more closely related to those industries operating with
larger shares of production (low skilled) workers. These lower-end activities are generally
among the rst to be considered for o¤shoring.
6 Concluding remarks
Here I have committed myself to the study of the employment e¤ects of materials and
services o¤shoring for the Japanese industries during the period 1980-2005. I have relied on
a revised version of the o¤shoring intensity index rst developed by Feenstra and Hanson
(1996), thus producing both our measure of materials and services o¤shoring. Both indices
have shown to behave rather di¤erently, especially after 1990. While the former has increased
dramatically, the latter has remained almost unchanged for the whole period.
Later I have reviewed the evolution of the Japanese industries towards an economy more
focused on services. I have argued that the evidence presented here points to a delayed
process of deindustrialization, possibly as a result of a protracted period of exports-oriented
growth. Several of the macroeconomic indicators sustain this hypothesis. At this point
I have retaken the subject of o¤shoring to deliver an industry-by-industry account of the
extent of the phenomenon. I have found that, in the aggregate, it is services industries which
have contributed the most to the growth in both indices during our period of analysis.
Subsequently, I have carried out the empirical exercise about the employment e¤ects of
o¤shoring, which constitutes the main contribution of the paper. This is basically divided
in two. First, the estimation of the long run elasticities and, through that, the estimation
of the amount of jobs lost or created as a direct result of o¤shoring. And second, the
correlation analysis which intends to complement the previous analysis by throwing light on
some particular features of the industries. In this manner, I have come to some conclusions
that deserve some additional discussion and more of our attention.
Exaggerated numbers on the costs attached to o¤shoring are easily produced in the
current debate, both by consulting companies and news reports alike. This usually moves
politicians and the public opinion (unions, most representatively) in the same direction.
O¤shoring is necessarily bad for domestic employment, since those jobs previously performed
within the national borders are now taken to other horizons ("one job o¤shored is one job
lost"). However, a short-sighted reading like that could prevent a real understanding of the
subject. Entrepreneurs, in reducing their costs (or maximizing their prots for that matter),
are just fullling a social function. It is then natural that they look into the world pool of
employment seeking to exploit the geographic comparative advantages (e.g. cheaper labor)
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whenever they deem it appropriate.
Economics is certainly not a zero-sum game. In e¤ect, productivity gains of o¤shoring
are a most probable result leading to price discounts and a boost in domestic demand,
which might a¤ect employment positively. In this paper I tried to prove that negative as
well as positive e¤ects of o¤shoring are natural and o¤setting forces dwelling in the realm
of international trade. Oppositely, and mainly motivated by political interests, hampering
forces like trade unions and regulations would do nothing but distort the picture.
Productivity gains for Japanese rms due to o¤shoring activities have been documented
in Hijzen et al. (2006). Although I have not dealt with the e¤ects of o¤shoring on pro-
ductivity, I have argued, following Amiti and Wei (2005, 2006), that positive employment
e¤ects are achievable when the scale e¤ect (or long run productivity e¤ect) overcomes both
the substitution and short run productivity e¤ects. This was the case in several industries
of both the manufacturing and services sector, and as a consequence of both materials and
services o¤shoring. In particular, I have estimated an increase of 23,997 and 34,637 jobs as
a result of materials and services o¤shoring respectively, for the period 1980-2005. As for
the negative e¤ects the estimations were 75,935 and 7,842 jobs. Hence, the negative net
result rises to nearly 25,000 jobs lost due to o¤shoring during those 25 years. Undoubtedly,
a non-signicant gure when compared to the 9.5 million jobs created in these industries
during the same period.
On other accounts, the presence of skill upgrading in Japan was studied by Head and
Ries (2002). There, changes in overseas employment shares can explain increases in the
share of nonproduction (skilled) workers. We can reconcile this with our ndings above. As
noted before, major increases in employment due to both types of o¤shoring have taken place
within the services sector, especially in retail, medical (private), and other miscellaneous
services. Concurrently, major drops have been observed within the manufacturing sector
(the industry labeled as miscellaneous manufacturing stands out). The services sector is
often characterized by higher skilled workers, as compared to manufacturing. Furthermore,
the evidence from the correlation analysis suggests that, for services o¤shoring only, the
positive employment e¤ect is larger and the negative e¤ect smaller, the more the industry
relies on high skilled workers. This gives the idea of an upgrading process going on for those
industries, since high skilled workers are favored at the expense of lower skilled ones.
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A Appendix: Japans labor share
The labor share of industries can be usually expressed as the ratio of total compensation of
employees to net and gross value added. In formulas, we have:
lsit =

wit
wit + itit + opsit

(A1)
ls0it =

wit
wit + ckit + itit + opsit

(A2)
where w is compensation of employees, and the denominator in A1 is the industrys net
value added , which is made up of those compensations plus indirect taxes and subsidies
(it) and operating surplus (ops); the denominator in A2 is the industrys gross value added,
which adds consumption of xed capital (ck).
So I drop all industries in the sample which do not comply with 0 < ls0it < 1, since
this would not be realistic.24 The following are the 25 industries not considered in the
estimations due to the erratic behavior of their labor shares. We can see a clear majority
of services industries.
Other: Manufacturing: Services:
Rice, wheat production Animal foods & fertilizers Housing
Miscellaneous crop farming Textile products Railway
Agricultural services Leather and leather products Water transportation
Waste disposal Electronics, computer eqpmnt. Other transportation and packing
Construction Mail
Civil engineering Research (private)
Hygiene (private and non-profit)
Other public services
Video and sound
Accommodation
Other services for individuals
Education (public)
Medical (public)
Research (non-profit)
Activities not elsewhere classified
Furthermore, we should note, following Wakita (2006), that a constant labor share is
implied in theory by the CobbDouglas production function. Thus, calculations on labor
shares should be based on the production function, as the latter would include the depreci-
ation of capital. On the other hand, relying on national income data would otherwise mean
the risk of overstating the labor share due to increasing depreciation, a well-known fact in
Japan throughout our whole period of analysis.
24Below I explain why I decide to go for the gross output-based measure (ls0it) and not the net output-based
measure (lsit).
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From the examination of gure A1 we notice that the labor share based on the production
function approach (that is, accounting for depreciation) has remained rather stable in the
last three decades (especially from 1980 to 2000). I here present both measures, with and
without depreciation, yet for the ltering of our database it is the gross measure I use as a
reference.25 As shown by the linear trends drawn in the graph, the increasing consumption
of xed capital might lead to exaggerating the real extent of the share. The gure below
conrms previous evidence on its relative stability when taking account of the depreciation
of capital. Wakita (2006, p. 79) presents a similar gure using data from the System of
National Accounts (93SNA).
Figure A1: Labor share, 1973-2005
Note: slash-dotted lines show linear trends; left axis is for labor shares, right axis for depreciation.
Source: own calculations, JIP database (2008).
25As stated before, for the gross GDP measure I discard 25 industries. For the net GDP measure, in
turn, the number of industries where the labor share does not behave properly is now 41. Accordingly, both
measures in gure A1 are calculated having this peculiarity in mind.
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B Appendix: Correlation analysis
Figure B1: Positive elasticities and selected key variables
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(continued)
Note: vertical axes are the estimated long run elasticities; outliers removed (2 range).
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Figure B2: Negative elasticities and selected key variables
39
(continued)
Note: vertical axes are the estimated long run elasticities; outliers removed (2 range).
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